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Abstract: Investors in hedge funds and commodity trading advisors  [CTA’s] are naturally concerned
with risk as well as return. In this paper, we investigate risk of hedge funds  and  CTA’s in light of
managerial career concerns.  We find an association between past performance and risk levels
consistent with  Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) findings for mutual fund managers. Good
performers in the first half of the year reduce the volatility of their portfolios, and poor performers
increase volatility.  These “variance strategies" depend upon the fund’s ranking relative to other
funds. The importance of relative rankings as opposed to the absolute ranking suggested by analysis
of hedge fund and CTA manager contracts points to the importance of reputation costs. These costs
are best thought of in the context of the career concerns of managers and the relative importance of
fund termination. We analyze factors contributing to fund disappearance.  Survival depends on both
absolute and relative performance. Excess volatility can also lead to termination. Finally, other things
equal, the younger a fund, the more likely it is to disappear from the sample. Therefore our results
strongly confirm an hypothesis of Fung and Hsieh (1997b) that reputation costs have a mitigating
effect on the gambling incentives implied by the manager contract. Particularly for young funds, a
volatility strategy that increases the value of a performance fee option may lead to the premature
death of that option through termination of the fund.  The finding that hedge fund and CTA volatility
is conditional upon past performance has implications for investors, lenders and regulators. An
important result of our finding is that variance strategy depends upon relative rather than absolute
1performance evaluation.
2I. Introduction
Hedge funds and commodity trading advisors [CTAs] are curiosities in the investment
management industry.   Unlike mutual funds and most pension fund managers, they have
contracts that specify a dramatically asymmetric reward. Hedge fund managers and commodity
trading advisors are both compensated with contracts that pay a fixed percentage of assets and a
fraction of returns above a benchmark of the treasury bill rate or zero.  In addition, most of these
contracts contain a “high water mark” provision that requires the manager to make up past
deficits  before earning the incentive portion of the fee. These contract provisions would suggest
that hedge fund managers have a strong incentive to take on extreme risk, particularly when their
incentive contract is out of the money. The interesting fact is that they do not behave as this
simple theory would suggest. We find that excess risk and poor relative performance increase
substantially the probability of termination, and that this represents a reputation cost sufficient to
offset the adverse gambling incentive of the high watermark contract. An important result of our
finding is that variance strategy depends upon relative rather than absolute performance
evaluation.  Our evidence on  “relative performance” competition among managers in the hedge
fund industry sheds light on factors influencing managerial careers.   The need to beat the pack,
rather than beating a fixed benchmark appears to influence management risk choice.  Risk
choice, in turn has an effect on future survival.
Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (1997), Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Carpenter
(2000) all show analytically that the  value of the manager’s contract is increasing in portfolio
variance due to the call-like feature of the incentive contract.  Thus, when the incentive contract
is out-of-the-money,  managers have a strong incentive to increase variance.  On the other hand,
3as Fung and Hsieh (1997b) show, reputational concerns and contractual constraints may mitigate
or prevent such behavior.  There is a clear tension between risk-taking  and the desire to preserve
or develop a reputation once the reputation has been developed.
 Prospects for future employment within a firm and within the industry are undoubtably a
strong motivator. We have collected data on individual managers active in the offshore fund
industry over the period 1989 through 1995.  The data represent a large fraction of  the major
hedge fund managers and large hedge funds during the period.   We are able to explore in some
detail how frequently managers are fired in the hedge fund industry, and also  their potential for
re-employment following firing.  We find that, once a manager drops from our sample the
chances or re-appearing as a money manager are very small.  This sends support to the idea that
the threat of firing is a major one.
The extent to which reputational issues relate to or offset the incentives to gamble is in
the end an empirical issue. We use technology developed by Brown Harlow and Starks (1995)
[BHS] to address this. BHS present strong evidence on mutual fund variance strategies, although
their work is limited to managers compensated by fixed or at best symmetric compensation plans. 
While fund managers may be paid performance bonuses, mutual funds are not permitted to
charge asymmetric  fees.   On the other hand, hedge funds and CTAs are – thus, our data allows
us to examine the variance strategies of managers compensated asymmetrically.  Our results are
on the surface puzzling — despite major differences in the form of manager compensation, we
find little difference between the behavior of hedge fund/CTA managers and mutual fund
managers.  We identify a significant reduction in variance conditional upon having  performed
well and limited evidence that managers who perform less well increase their risk exposure.
4However, we find little or no evidence that poor performers who survive increase volatility to
meet their high water mark.
To examine the issue of how the variance strategy interacts with the high water mark
threshold, we examine whether manager strategies are conditional upon absolute versus relative
performance cutoffs.  While the high water mark contract is designed to induce behavior
conditional upon absolute performance, in fact we find evidence that the variance strategy
depends on relative performance. These variance strategies do not depend at all on absolute
performance despite the popular perception that hedge fund managers are market neutral and care
only about absolute performance1.
The fact that variance strategies depend on relative but not absolute performance suggests
that reputation costs, or institutional constraints proxying for them, indeed play a significant role
in modifying incentives to take risk.    Although there is little in the high water mark contract to
explicitly penalize poorly performing  managers there are great implicit costs to taking risks that
might lead to termination.   To pursue this matter further, we examine the factors associated with
funds and managers exiting the industry. Negative returns over one year and two year horizons
increase the likelihood of fund termination. However, even controlling for this, relative returns
and volatility also play a significant role. The younger the fund, other things equal, the more
likely it is to be terminated.  Our survival analysis suggests that CTAs and hedge fund managers
are seriously concerned with closure, as opposed to maximizing the option-like feature of their
contract.
Our findings have implications for investors, lenders and regulators.   If hedge fund and
CTA risk depends upon relative performance, then investors and lenders can adjust their
5exposure to such risk accordingly.  Our negative findings regarding risk-taking conditional upon
poor absolute performance should be valuable to regulators concerned with preparing for worst-
case scenarios. 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section provides the institutional context for
the career concerns of managers in the hedge fund industry.  The third section discusses the data. 
Section four reports the results of our empirical analysis, section five considers the causes of
fund attrition in detail and section six concludes.
II.  Industry Structure and Manager Careers
Chevalier and Ellison (1997)  show that career concerns of mutual fund managers play a
significant role in their decision about risk.  They show that fund managers are frequently
terminated (or quit)  and they frequently  re-appear later, managing other funds.  Both the
systematic and the unsystematic risk they choose for their fund appear to impact their future
ability to secure employment in the industry.  We would  expect similar concerns among hedge
fund managers, however the nature of the hedge fund industry differs from that of the mutual
fund industry in ways that could potentially affect manager risk choice.  Not only are manager
contracts asymmetric in the payoffs, but the ability of a manager to raise additional money or
start another fund in the future is likely to be as important as whether he is fired as a manager.  In
the section that follows, we describe the general nature of the hedge fund manager contract.
Hedge funds are managed by one or more individuals who aggregate money from
accounts and invest them in securities.  The principal feature distinguishing a hedge fund from a
mutual fund  is that is does not conform to the standards established under the Investment
6Company Act of 1940. By not conforming to the range of standards in the act, hedge funds are
prevented from public offering of their services.  Until 1996, investment companies that did not
conform to the requirements for open or closed-end mutual fund status were prevented from
having  than 99 U.S. investors.  In 1996, this limitation was raised to 499, however investors
were required to demonstrate a level of sophistication that certified they understood the risks
involved.  The importance of this distinction for the current study is that hedge fund managers
cannot easily and widely market their services.   Constraints on the number of accounts means
that managers must focus on a select number of potential clients.  Because of the limits on
numbers of accounts, no client is atomistic -- the threat of withdrawal is important and the
potential for communication among a few large clients cannot be discounted.    This threat helps
understand the two basic types of hedge funds -- single manager and multiple manager funds. 
Single manager funds offer  the services of one manager with his or her own management style
and track record.  Multiple manager funds, also called fund-of-funds, are investment pools that
holds shares in a number of single manager funds and charges a fee for selecting or providing
access to those funds.  The role of a fund of funds is thus not only to cull managers with superior
ability.  It also provides smaller investors access to major single-manager funds which otherwise
might be closed to outside investment as a result of the numerical  limitation on accounts. 
Conversely, the fund of fund is an intermediary that provides investment capital to managers who
otherwise may not have access to investors due to SEC restrictions on the marketing of their
services.   Because funds may retain more than one manager and managers may work for more
than one fund, a fund manager’s career is best characterized by a time-series of annual
engagements by one or more funds.  Even when a fund closes or drops a manager, that manager
7may continue to work in the industry as a manager of another fund.  Survival in the industry
means retaining at least one engagement.  In the analysis below, we use a database of annual
manager engagements to examine the survival rate of managers.  The database allows us to
consider the factors that may impact the career concerns of hedge fund managers -- particularly
concerns about disappearing from the business.
II.2 Manager data
We collected data on 715 hedge fund managers who were associated from 1989 through
1995 with offshore funds listed in the Offshore Funds Directory, [OFD] an annual compendium
of Offshore funds performance.  The OFD is unusual in that is is published each year and allows
concrete verification that the data are not backfilled.  The problems of survival conditioning and
backfilling of hedge fund data bases is now well known.   While offshore funds are a sub-sample
of hedge funds, they are a sub-sample of major players in the industry.  Most of the major hedge
funds during this period had offshore vehicles for investment.  The database is used in Brown,
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999) to analyze the performance of edge funds as an asset class.  In
the current paper, however, we focus explicitly on managers, their compensation and their career
trajectories.  The database helps to understand the apparent paradox of managers failure to
maximize the value of an option.
Of the 715 managers that appeared in the database over the seven year period, we
identified 2,221 separate engagement-years.  An engagement for a manager is an employment
contract with a single fund.  An engagement-year is one completed year of this contract.   Our of
715 managers, 278 disappeared from the sample before the final year 1995.   We found 373
8disengagements from funds in the sample and of these, 322 resulted in the manager disappearing
from the sample, while 51 of these disengagements resulted in the manager dropping to a lower
number of engagements.  Most striking in the database is the inability of managers to re-appear
in the database after dropping out.  We found only five instances of a manager re-appearing. Our
enumeration of manager disengagements suggests that there is a significant attrition rate for
managers, that disengagements typically  mean disappearance and reappearance is rare.  All of
these point to the desirability of avoiding disengagement.
III.  Available fund data
TASS is a New York-based advisory and information service that maintains a large
database of CTA and hedge fund managers that we used in this analysis.  This TASS data is used
in recent research by  Fung and Hsieh (1997a&b).  A competitor to TASS, Managed Account
Reports (MAR) has data on both manager populations as well, and this is the data used by
Ackerman, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) and Park (1995)2.   Neither of these two sources is
a “follow-forward” database of the kind used in BGI. Consequently  we could not verify the
extent to which defunct funds have been dropped from the sample until very recently. TASS has
recognized the importance of maintaining defunct funds in their data, and since 1994 they have
kept records of hedge funds that cease to operate. Fung and Hsieh (1997b) find evidence that the
survival bias in the TASS CTA returns is more than 3% per year. Because of the limited
coverage of the database before 1988, we use TASS data for the period 1989-98 in our study. We
have augmented this database by hand collecting missing data, and by using information
provided by Daniel B. Stark & Co., Inc. for CTA data not covered by TASS. Table 1 contains a
9count of the funds in this augmented database.
Survival is not the only potential conditioning in the data.  Park’s (1995) analysis of the
MAR data suggests that funds are typically brought into the database with a history.   This
conditioning has two separate implications.  First, a fund might be brought in because the
manager has chosen to report a good track record -- i.e., self-selection bias.  Second, a survival
bias is imparted because having a two-year or more track record implies that the fund survived
for two years, while others with similar characteristics failed. Ackermann, McEnally and
Ravenscraft(1999)  have an extensive analysis of these different sources of bias in a similar
hedge fund sample.3  Table 1 reports the time-series counts of CTAs and hedge funds.  Notice
that survival is an important issue for TASS' CTAs — roughly 20% disappear per year since
1990.   The 20% attrition rate for CTAs is consistent with the numbers in BGI for offshore hedge
funds.  The attrition rates for the TASS hedge funds are suspiciously lower — less than 15% per
year since 1994.  However, the half life of the TASS hedge funds is exactly 30 months (Figure
1), which corresponds to the offshore hedge fund results reported by BGI. CTA funds have a
shorter half life of only two years.  
Recent evidence suggests that both single-period and multi-period conditioning implies
that analysis of surviving fund returns can lead to  false inferences4. Evidence suggests that 
multi-period conditioning is indeed a feature of this industry. Therefore  it seems likely that the
statistical analysis of  both of these databases is likely to be biased.  Fortunately, the direction of
at least some of these biases are well understood and will be discussed further in Section IV. 
IV.  Volatility Strategies  
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IV.1 Sorts by Deciles
 Following BHS, we test whether fund performance in one period explains the change in
variance of fund returns in the following period.  Figures 2 and 3 show the simplest form of this
test for CTAs and hedge funds.  For each year in the sample, we compute performance deciles
based on January through June total return. We then compute monthly returns in excess of style
benchmarks5 and calculate the variance of excess returns for the period January-June and July-
December. The ratio of these two numbers is then a measure of the extent to which fund
managers increase volatility in the course of the year. The figures plot the median variance ratio
by performance decile. They show clear evidence that funds that do exceptionally well in the first
half of the year reduce variance. This is true for both hedge funds (Figure 2) and CTAs (Figure
3). In both cases the reduction in volatility is most significant in the highest decile of
performance. In addition, hedge funds and CTAs that perform worse than the median manager
increase variance.
A simple explanation for this pattern of variance changes is that funds adopt a passive
leverage policy. Most of the funds in the sample use a substantial amount of leverage. Passive
leverage is one possible explanation for the very high leverage ratios reported for Long-Term
Capital Management in September 1998. As the asset value of the fund fell,  borrowing was
constant. The further the fund fell in value, the higher was its leverage and consequent volatility.
As the value of the fund rose again, leverage fell and so too did volatility. To test this theory, we
divided the sample up into those who lost money, and those who gained during the first six
months. The average leverage for the first group will have risen and the average leverage for the
second group will have fallen over the sample period. The passive leverage hypothesis would
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predict that the first group will experience a rise in volatility, with the greatest rise among those
funds whose loss in the second period was greater than the loss in the first period. The same
hypothesis would predict that the funds that made money in the first six months will experience a
fall in volatility. The largest decrease in volatility will occur among those funds whose return
July through December exceeds the positive return in the first half of the year. Neither
implication is supported in the data6.
It is also important to consider active constraints on leverage that may be imposed
by lenders.  Credit may be suspended after extreme performance.  Lenders may not give the poor
performers the resources to take larger risks, even if the manager wanted to do so.  This would
tend to offset the leverage effect, making it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis that
managers seek to  “double-down.”   The experience of 1998 shows that funds who do really 
poorly may be forced by lenders  to liquidate assets to pay down debt.  There thus may be limits
to the passive leverage effects.  The may help explain the results we find for extreme performers.
While poor performers do increase variance, we find that the greatest increase in volatility occurs
among the median performers, rather than among the worst performers. The increase in volatility
among the poor performers is only marginally significant.  Given that the manager’s incentive is
essentially a call option with exercise price determined by the high water mark provision, one
would expect a rational manager to  increase the value of this out-of-the-money option by
increasing variance7.  Indeed, this is the classic moral hazard problem induced by asymmetric
incentives.  Given that  20% of CTA managers disappear each year since 1990, any fund in the
lowest decile may have a reasonably high probability of disappearance.  Any manager who
judges his or her likelihood of disappearance at mid year as a virtual certainty has a powerful
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incentive to “double down” by taking much higher risks. Clearly, another factor must be at work
that persuades poorly performing managers to limit any increase in volatility. 
One conjecture discussed above  is that lenders will not let them take on more risk.   Fung
and Hsieh (1997b) examine a closely related conjecture about extreme poor performers, which
they term an “end-game” strategy.  They offer another hypothesis that may explain why poor
performers do not “double down.”  They look at firms that are likely to go out of business. 
Those that are part of a multi-fund firm, they assert, will be less likely to take big risks when they
are down, and more likely to be shut down before doing really poorly.   This is because a poor
performer makes the whole firm look bad.  In fact, they find that CTA funds in multi-manager
firms do relatively better, and take less systematic risk -- both consistent with the hypothesis that
there are reputational externalities that may prevent big gambles. Our results appear to provide
support for this hypothesis as well as the lender constraint story.  In one case the enforcement
mechanism is conditional bank control.  In the other, reputation concerns proxy for external
control.
IV.2 Contingency Table Tests
Table 2 tests the significance of the strategic use of variance by the funds in our sample.
These results are exactly conformable with similar results reported by BHS for a six-month
comparison period. Results broken down by CTAs and hedge funds exhibited the same patten.
This period represents half of the normal annual reporting period for hedge funds and CTAs.  If
we define high return funds as funds whose six month return is in excess of that of the median
fund, we find on a year by year basis that high return funds decrease variance while low return
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funds increase variance. This is true nine years out of ten for the whole sample, eight years out of
ten for CTAs and five out of ten for hedge fund. The pattern is statistically significant for all
years taken together. The reversals of pattern are small in number and in any event are not
statistically significant. The magnitude of these numbers matches the numbers reported on a
similar basis by BHS.
These results seem to suggest that poor performers do indeed increase the volatility of
their funds as a strategic response to the nature of their performance incentive contract. Taken at
face value, it would appear that the managers are responding to the fact that their options are out
of the money by increasing variance. However, this hypothesis is not correct. The second panel
of  the table examines the strategic response to whether the performance fee options are in or out
of the money8. Here we find a very different picture. Not only do we fail to find that losers
increase volatility and winners decrease volatility. Sometimes, losers actually decrease volatility,
and winners increase volatility. In any event, the strategic volatility pattern is significant in only
one year (1990) for each of the fund groupings, and is insignificant over all. Evidently,
performance relative to other funds is important, while performance relative to the high water
mark is not.
Is this pattern induced by survival? Simulations approximating these strategic variance
tests are reported in Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1997).  We show that a 10%
performance cut on the first period, corresponding to the elimination of the worst decile of
performers would induce a “J” shape response of variance to returns.  To the extent that the
strategic variance effect is a reduction of variance by winners, the simulations in the BGIR 97
article would bias the test towards type II error. In addition, survival arguments would suggest
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that winners would ex post display an increase in variance9. Thus, we do not believe the results
are due to conditioning upon survival over  the year-long period.
V.  Survival and  Relative Performance
While the high-water-mark contract is designed to induce behavior conditional upon
absolute performance, the results in Figures 2 and 3, and Table 2 provides evidence that
managers pay more attention to their performance relative to the rest of the industry. This is
despite the popular perception that hedge fund managers are market neutral and care only about
absolute performance.   The results of the previous section clearly show that survival is at least as
important as a single-year performance  tournament.  The management incentive fee option
expires on termination of the fund.  Thus, any attempt to maximize a single-period fee option
represents a trade-off against risking the termination of the option value at the end of the period. 
What role does performance and risk play in fund termination?   We address this question
empirically in this section.
Table 3 reports the results from two kinds of analysis that support the contention that both
relative and absolute performance over multiple periods play a role in fund termination. Relative
performance is defined by the risk-adjusted performance (i.e. the alpha) of the fund manager. 
This is similar to the relative performance measure in the previous table, with the additional 
adjustment for systematic risk exposure.   Absolute performance in the table is captured by an
indicator of whether the fund experienced positive returns in the previous periods.  Funds with
negative returns are those which are falling farther out of the money with respect to their high
water mark provisions.  
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Besides performance, volatility and seasoning are also important factors to include in the
estimation. For every quarter end from December 1989 (December 1993 for hedge funds) we
record the one quarter, one year and two year performance characteristics, volatility and
seasoning. We then record whether the fund survives the following quarter and perform a
standard Probit analysis of fund termination. The results are reported in the first panel of Table 3.
For CTA funds, poor absolute performance over both a one year and a two year holding
period basis significantly increase the probability of fund termination. This is consistent with a
view that fund  managers voluntarily terminate funds where there is no reasonable possibility of
meeting an increasing high water mark provision in the incentive contract. However, short term
relative performance and volatility also play a role. This suggests that not increasing volatility
may be quite rational for managers already at risk because of poor performance. The increase in
volatility may increase the chance of the incentive contract ending up in the money, but may of
itself increase the probability of termination and poor short term returns that would also
contribute to termination.
 Seasoning appears to play a role in fund survival.  This is consistent with the results of
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) who find that more seasoned managers are less concerned with
termination.   We find that the longer the fund has been in existence, the more likely it is to
survive.  The role of seasoning bears closer examination. In a recent paper, Lunde, Timmermann
and Blake (1999) argue persuasively that a Probit analysis is too restrictive. It requires not only
strong distributional assumptions, but also strong parametric assumptions about the role of
seasoning in the survival of funds. They argue for a semi parametric Cox hazard rate regression
approach. Applying this to the data yields almost precisely the same answers as the Probit
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analysis. It confirms that our results are robust to the way we have modeled survival.
It is interesting to compare CTA results and hedge fund results. While most of the results
are similar across the two fund groups, they differ in three important respects. While short term
poor performance is less important for hedge funds,  hedge funds are more likely to be
terminated if they have poor relative performance measured on an annual basis. The Investment
Company Act of 1940 imposes important restrictions on the distribution of information about
hedge funds, whereas CFTC regulation implies that CTA clients  have access to reliable and
timely information to evaluate relative performance. This is at least a partial explanation for the
relative importance of short term performance information for CTAs. The same argument may
explain why it is that avoiding excess volatility is far more critical for hedge fund survival than
for CTAs. Other things equal, the more risk a hedge fund takes on, the less likely it is to survive.
The final and most important difference in the hedge fund manager results is the influence of
volatility on disappearance.  We find strong evidence that higher risk is a factor in the
termination of the fund.  After controlling for relative performance, seasoning and volatility,
hedge funds are increasingly more likely to be terminated.  The relationship between volatility
and termination provides a disincentive for hedge fund managers to gamble excessively when
they fall below their high water mark. While one might expect that termination and risk-taking is 
may be a Long-Term Capital Management spillover effect, it appears to have been evident before
the well-publicized problems of that particular hedge fund.  As such, it has likely been an




Financial economists have long debated what kind of incentives may induce managers to
take a longer view rather than to maximize short-term performance.    In the investment industry
it is possible for participants to observe, quantify and contract on performance.  Hedge funds and
CTA’s typically have incentive contracts that asymmetrically compensate managers based on
annual performance.   In this setting, a single-period theoretical analysis might suggest that
managers below their high water marks have a strong incentive to increase risk, irrespective of
the performance of  other managers in their industry.   We find this not to be the case.  The high
water mark threshold has little effect on managerial choice of risk – manager risk choice appears
more strongly motivated by industry benchmarks. We interpret this apparent contradiction to
strong manager concerns about their future in the industry.  The threat of  termination is
apparently a much stronger motivator than a single-year gain.  Our  data thus  appears to evidence
the kind of multi-period conditioning analyzed by Carpenter and Lynch (1999), suggesting that
future modeling of the industry and of manager career concerns has to take into account  long
term performance effects. 10 
Applying a probit  model to hedge fund and CTA  industry data over a number of years,
we find that fund termination is a function of performance relative to high water mark thresholds
as well as industry benchmarks. The former suggests that managers shut down when they are too
far from their strike price, and the latter suggests that investors deciding whether to withdraw
funds may implicitly compare a fund performance its peers, even controlling for distance from
the high water mark.  Thus a  fund lagging the industry is less likely to survive.  Finally, we
document the relationship between risk and survival and seasoning.  We find that riskier funds
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are less likely to survive another year, and that older funds are less sensitive to performance.  
Taken together, our results imply that, despite the seeming moral hazard implicit in asymmetric
performance contracts,  the hedge fund and CTA industry provides s disincentives to the
maximization of short-term profits through risk-taking  – our results imply that survival in the
industry  is apparently too valuable.   Despite widely publicized fund closures and restructurings
over the past few years, there is little evidence that funds in the industry increase risk to take
advantage of incentive contract terms – their risk-taking is more likely driven by peer
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   1971 1 1 0 1
1972 1 0 0 1
1973 2 1 0 2
1974 3 1 0 3
1975 4 1 0 4
1976 6 2 0 6
1977 7 1 0 7 2 2 0 2
1978 8 1 0 8 4 2 0 4
1979 13 5 0 13 5 1 0 5
1980 20 7 0 20 6 1 0 6
1981 29 9 0 29 8 2 0 8
1982 37 8 0 37 12 4 0 12
1983 50 13 0 50 19 7 0 19
1984 77 27 0 77 28 9 0 28
1985 107 30 0 107 35 7 0 35
1986 142 35 1 141 53 18 0 53
1987 189 47 3 185 82 29 0 82
1988 254 65 5 245 109 27 0 109
1989 443 99 13 331 151 21 0 130
1990 563 116 51 396 258 64 0 194
1991 750 177 65 508 304 55 0 249
1992 870 181 72 617 457 104 1 352
1993 975 179 97 699 706 177 2 527
1994 1055 178 132 745 877 175 16 686
1995 1091 173 131 787 1096 205 57 834
1996 1069 141 130 798 1290 228 110 952
1997 1036 119 78 839 1410 229 110 1071
1998 995 78 146 771 1411 170 168 1073
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Figure 1
This figure gives the fraction of funds alive after six months that survive in the database for the specified duration of
time. This calculation excludes the CTA funds in the database prior to January 1989. We exclude hedge funds in the




This figure gives the change in volatility for CTAs as a function of relative performance in the first six months. The solid
line gives the median volatility ratio for all CTA funds in the sample period 1989-98 with at least one year of complete
data, and the dotted lines give the 95% confidence band for the median.  The variance ratio is defined as the ratio of
variance of return in excess of style benchmark for the second six month period to the variance of the first six month
excess return, and deciles of return are defined relative to realized return measured over the first six months, and excess
return is defined relative to style benchmarks. This classification is repeated for each year of our sample 1989-98.
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Figure 3
This figure gives the change in volatility for hedge funds as a function of relative performance in the first six months. The
solid line gives the median volatility ratio for all hedge funds in the sample period 1989-98 with at least one year of
complete data, and the dotted lines give the 95% confidence band for the median.  The variance ratio is defined as the
ratio of variance of return in excess of style benchmark for the second six month period to the variance of the first six
month excess return, and deciles of return are defined relative to realized return measured over the first six months, and
excess return is defined relative to style benchmarks. This classification is repeated for each year of our sample 1989-98.
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Table 2: Returns and Subsequent Volatility Change
a. Median Return Benchmark
Year




Variance ratio low Variance ratio high Variance ratio low Variance ratio high
1989 92 126 126 93 -0.6182 -3.19 10.27**
1990 122 156 156 122 -0.4917 -2.88 8.32**
1991 149 180 180 149 -0.3780 -2.41 5.84*
1992 201 212 212 201 -0.1066 -0.77 0.59
1993 245 283 283 245 -0.2884 -2.34 5.47*
1994 303 322 322 304 -0.1183 -1.05 1.09
1995 357 363 363 358 -0.0305 -0.29 0.08
1996 368 428 428 369 -0.2994 -2.98 8.89**
1997 442 440 440 443 0.0113 0.12 0.01
1998 411 468 468 411 -0.2598 -2.72 7.39**
1989-98 2690 2978 2978 2695 -0.2016 -5.36 28.75**
b. Highwater Benchmark
Year
Funds with Jan-Jun return less than highwater
mark




Variance ratio low Variance ratio high Variance ratio low Variance ratio high
1989 41 51 177 168 -0.2704 -1.15 1.32
1990 52 95 226 183 -0.8137 -4.09 17.1**
1991 128 144 201 185 -0.2007 -1.27 1.6
1992 217 223 196 190 -0.0584 -0.42 0.18
1993 112 136 416 392 -0.2536 -1.74 3.04
1994 313 341 312 285 -0.1762 -1.55 2.42
1995 300 290 420 431 0.0598 0.56 0.31
1996 250 262 546 535 -0.0672 -0.63 0.39
1997 244 215 638 668 0.1725 1.59 2.52
1998 348 338 531 541 0.0478 0.49 0.24
1989-98 2005 2095 3663 3578 -0.0674 -1.72 2.97
Numbers in the body of the table give the number of funds falling in each classification for all the funds in the sample (results were ver
similar broken down into CTAs and hedge funds). Each fund was required to have a complete return history for each calendar year. Jan-
Jun return is defined as the total fund return measured over the first six months of each year, and is measured relative to a benchmark of
the median fund return over that six month period (Median return benchmark) or highwater mark assuming losses from previous year are
carried forward. The variance ratio is defined as the ratio of variance of return in excess of style benchmark for the second six month
period to the variance of the first six month excess return. Variance ratio low is defined as a variance ratio less than the median for all
funds in the calendar year, and variance ratio high is defined as a variance ratio greater than or equal to the median for all funds. Similar
results were obtained defining the variance ratio in terms of realized returns as opposed to excess returns. The log-odds ratio is the log of
the ratio of the product of the first and fourth columns to the product of the second and third, and the t-value measures significance of
this quantity. The Chi-square numbers represent the P2(1) statistics from the 2×2 contingency tables, with values significant at the 5%
level denoted by a single asterisk, and those significant at the 1% level by a double asterisk. Note that this contingency table statistic is
misspecified in this application since the cell counts are not independent. The log odds ratio statistic is robust to this misspecification. 
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Table 3: The effect of return, risk and seasoning on fund failure






(year) Age of fund Time
Standard
deviation
-0.1026 0.2602 0.3647 -0.1071 -0.0129 -0.0037 0.0199 0.6001
 (-1.64)  (3.92)  (6.01)  (-3.36)  (-0.52)  (-2.76)  (1.43)  (1.32)
-0.0869 0.3813 -0.1037 -0.0359 -0.0033 0.0179 1.0181
 (-1.40)  (6.15)  (-3.27)  (-1.47)  (-2.50)  (1.30)  (2.31)





(year) Age of fund Time
Standard
deviation
-0.0173 0.1007 0.2544 -0.0360 -0.0881 -0.0061 0.1561 3.0000
 (-0.23)  (1.22)  (3.15)  (-1.05)  (-3.69)  (-3.94)  (7.06)  (3.84)
-0.0111 0.2050 -0.0328 -0.0965 -0.0058 0.1502 3.5003
 (-0.15)  (2.76)  (-0.96)  (-4.08)  (-3.77)  (6.90)  (4.66)









-0.2318 0.5553 0.6852 -0.2371 -0.0255 0.0361 1.4989
 (-1.70)  (3.88)  (5.30)  (-3.42)  (-0.50)  (1.21)  (1.67)
-0.0556 0.7128 -0.1867 -0.1006 0.0367 1.6106
 (-0.49)  (6.45)  (-3.18)  (-2.40)  (1.59)  (2.50)








-0.0080 0.2084 0.5023 -0.0802 -0.1663 0.3213 5.2930
 (-0.05)  (1.15)  (2.92)  (-1.03)  (-3.25)  (6.40)  (3.73)
0.2677 0.4181 0.0078 -0.2065 0.3414 4.4930
(1.85)  (3.06)  (0.12)  (-4.81)  (8.45)  (3.84)
This table examines the effect of return, risk and seasoning on the survival of funds applying standard Probit
regression and Cox semiparametric hazard rate regression procedures on failure data for CTAs for the period
1989-98, and hedge funds for the period 1994-98. The coefficients in the Probit model are maximum likelihood
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estimates  for the model where  is a standard  Normal variate and the unobserved indicator
variable if the fund dies in period t (for a standard reference, see Greene(1997) Chapter 19) with t-values
in parentheses. The coefficients in the Cox semiparametric hazard rate regression model are maximum likelihood
estimates  (t-values in parentheses) for the model where is the hazard rate, the fraction of funds
alive prior to   that die at . The coefficient  is referred to as the baseline hazard rate. This approach makes
fewer parametric assumptions about the distribution of the data and does not specify a particular functional form
for the role of seasoning in the survival of funds (Lunde, Timmermann and Blake 1999). The variables
Under_quarter, Under_year and Under_2year are dummy variables which are one if the fund records a negative
holding period return over the prior quarter, year and two year holding periods respectively, Alpha(quarter) and
Alpha(year) refer to the ratio of the excess return over the holding period as a fraction of the standard deviation of
excess return measured over the prior year multiplied by the square root of the number of months in the holding
period, Age of Fund is measured in months, time is a trend term measured in years and Standard Deviation is the
standard deviation of excess returns measured over the prior year.
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1.However, this result is consistent with the  theory and empirical results in Massa (1997) who
finds  that relative ranking will tend to dominate as the basis for manager behavior.
2.Ackerman, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) also includes data from another vendor, Hedge
fund Research and Park (1995) includes data privately collected.
3.Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft(1999) argue that the survival bias is de minimis.
However, recent findings (Fung and Hsieh (2000) and Liang (2000)) argue that these results may
be an artefact of the particular database used by Ackermann et al.
4.See Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992),  Carhart (1997),  Hendricks, Patel and
Zeckhauser (1997) and Carpenter and Lynch (1997)
5.Eight style benchmarks were computed for this data using the GSC approach described in
Brown and Goetzmann (1997), a returns based procedure which like the technique described by
Fung and Hsieh (1997), allows styles to be characterized by time-varying factor exposure.
Ackerman McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) define style benchmarks using self-described style
characterizations provided to HFR. To the extent that styles share common risk characteristics,
this provides some extent of risk adjustment to returns. An earlier version of this paper reports
results using the volatility of raw returns, with very similar results. We examined whether results
reported in Figures 2 and 3 differ according to style of management. The figures were very
similar to those reported here. For each style winners decrease volatility significantly, while
losers increase volatility, albeit not significantly. In fact, for two of the eight style classifications
considered losers actually reduce volatility.
6.Taking the funds that lost money in the first six months, those that gained  more in the second
six months than they had lost in the first six months should have experienced a decrease or no
change in volatility as the average leverage did not increase. However, the median volatility ratio
was actually 1.1561, contrary to the passive leverage hypothesis.  Other funds ought to have
experienced a rise in volatility, with the greatest increase occurring for those funds that lost as
much in the second period as they had lost in the first period. However, while it is true that the
extreme losers did in fact increase volatility, with a  median variance ratio of 1.1739, the other
funds actually decreased volatility, with a variance ratio of 0.9331, contrary to the passive
leverage hypothesis. A similar pattern holds for funds that made money in the first six months.
Those who made more money by the end of the year than they had made in the first six months
and for which, by the passive leverage hypothesis, we would expect to have a substantial
reduction in volatility actually increased volatility with a variance ratio of 1.1003. Funds that lost
more than they had won also had an increased volatility with a variance ratio of 1.2578, while all
other winning funds had a volatility ratio of .9731. In each case, the difference from one is
significant at the 5% level.
7.However, note that this call option argument may actually be consistent with the median
manager having a substantial incentive to increase volatility, as the vega is greatest for at the
money options. We thank Steve Heston for this observation.
8.While a return less than zero implies that the managers’ option is out of the money, it does not
follow that a positive return implies that the option is in the money. Some managers are
Notes
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evaluated relative to a Tbill return benchmark, and of course managers whose high water mark
provision increased on account of a poor previous period return require a substantial positive
return before their incentive contract is in the money. It is difficult to model the in the moneyness
of the option due to these differences, and the fact that not all high water marks are adjusted on
an annual frequency. The second panel of the table assumes the benchmark is increased on an
annual basis to reflect past losses. Assuming the benchmark is reset to the current value of the
fund each year yields results very similar to those reported in Table 2, with an overall log-odds
ratio of -0.0304 (t-value -.74) and insignificant Chi-square of 0.54 for the period 1989-98
9.Suppose and  are the first and second period performance levels, independent and
identically distributed and suppose further that survival requires . Ex post survival
conditioning implies that second period variance is increasing in first period performance. Note
that  is an increasing function of first
period performance a. We thank Jennifer Carpenter for this observation.
10.The question of survival conditioning is potentially important to cross-sectional performance
studies. Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992) point out that survivorship can induce
spurious persistence in relative fund returns. Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1997) discover
that survival induces a “J-shape” in performance and variance conditional upon past returns,
while  Carhart (1997) and Carpenter and Lynch (1999) show how multi-period survival
conditioning induces contrasting patterns in persistence tests.  
